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Abstract: PPP is an alternative procurement method being adopted for public infrastructure development 
worldwide. In PPP method, public sector invites private agencies to bring their capital and technical assets for 
executing public projects. PPP is being popularized worldwide for its potential benefits. However, a number of 
projects with PPP process are failed in achieving the target in many countries. In Malaysia also, nowadays, Public-
private partnership (PPP) has been widely used in large scale infrastructure projects. PPP is considered as derivative 
of privatization concept in Malaysian context. The success and failure of PPP project depends on the performance of 
both public and private sectors. Thus, in order to achieve successful projects, it is very imperative that the role and 
performance of the two sectors be clearly identified and studied. Further, for achieving successful PPP projects, it is 
also very essential to learn the lesson from the past fail projects. Hence, this paper presents a case study of LRT 
project of Malaysia to understand the reason of failure. Study highlighted that Kuala Lumpur LRT project was failed 
during the operation phase. Key reason of the failure was the financial crisis of 1997 where inflation rate increased 
from 8% to over 40%. This financial crisis resulted to the less profit rate, and the concessionaires were not able to 
repay the loan to the banks which they had taken for LRT construction works. Finally, through undergoing a legal 
process in 2002, Syarikat Prasana Negara Berhad took over PUTRA-LRT and STAR-LRT on the behalf of the 
government of Malaysia. 
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1. Introduction 
PPP is an alternative procurement method 
being adopted for public infrastructure development 
worldwide. In PPP method, public sector invites 
private agencies to bring their capital and technical 
assets for executing public projects where the profits 
as well as risks associated with the projects are 
shared by public and private partners. Generally, 
private sector gets profit in the form of toll collection, 
received from the public on using the facility or in 
the form of payments directly from the government 
or public sector client. Public sector partners get 
profits in the form of developing public infrastructure 
facilities which results in extending the value for 
money (VFM) as compared to the conventional 
procurement methods. Currently, PPP models are 
becoming a central levy for governments around the 
world, especially in developing countries, to improve, 
develop and handle urban and national transportation 
networks. World Bank report also highlighted that, in 
developing nations, a total US$273,596 million are 
invested in transportation projects since 1990 under 
the scheme of Private Participation in Infrastructure 
(PPI). This investment is excluding the cancelled and 
distressed transportation PPP projects (Soomro and 
Zhang, 2013) 
In Malaysia also, nowadays, Public-private 
partnership (PPP) has been widely used in large scale 
infrastructure projects. PPP is considered as 
derivative of privatization concept. Besides, PPP is 
also seen as a new alternative of financing new 
facilities, rehabilitate and expand existing 
infrastructure projects involving private entities. 
Initially, in 9th Malaysian plan (9th
The success and failure of PPP projects 
depend on the performance of both public and private 
sector. Thus, in order to achieve successful projects, 
it is very imperative that the role and performance of 
the two sectors be clearly identified and studied. 
Further, for achieving successful PPP projects, it is 
also very essential to learn the lesson from the past 
fail projects. Hence, this study is focusing on 
studying the reasons of failure in Light Rail Transit 
(LRT) Kuala Lumpur project which is major 
infrastructure project for overcoming the congestion 
 MP) Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) which is a subset of the 
privatization policy was initiated as part of the 
procurement method under the PPP. It was expected 
that PFI will increase the participation of private 
sector in national development program (Public PPP 
Malaysia Guideline 2009). Consequently, a number 
of PPP projects have been executed successfully in 
the past decade in Malaysia, which includes North-
South Expressway project, Paka and Pasir Gudang 
Power Plant, Penang Bridge and others. However, 
unsuccessful cases are also abounding, such as the 
Malaysian Privatized National Sewerage project and 
Batu Pahat Municipal Council Bus Station project.  
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problem through the city areas. In this study failure is 
defined as the projects facing delay in construction 
period, quality of works not obtained and project not 
fulfilled client’s requirement (UKAS, 2014).  
 
2. Infrastructure Projects 
Infrastructure projects refer to the 
development project required to satisfy human needs. 
Besides that, infrastructure projects are vital in 
developing national economic growth. Infrastructure 
projects are classified into two categories which are 
economic and social. Economic infrastructure 
projects are the projects which support productive 
activities to enhance country’s economic growth 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Some of examples of 
economic infrastructure projects defined by Grimsey 
and Lewis (2004) and Wikipedia on infrastructure 
(2012) are: 
 Transportation Facilities: 
Transportation facilities comprises of the network of 
tracks to connect various areas of the country inside 
as well as with other parts of the world. It includes 
road network, rail networks, mass transit systems, Air 
paths, bridges, terminals, signals and others. 
 Energy Related Projects: These 
are the projects for generation and supply of various 
forms of energy to support social life, as well as 
transportation system and other human needs. Some 
of examples of energy related projects are electrical 
power plants, power distribution system, gas 
pipelines, petroleum storage and distribution system 
and others. 
 Water management projects: 
These projects ensure the availability of water needs 
for daily life, agricultural purpose and as well as 
other ancillary activities which consume water. The 
examples of waste management projects are drinking 
water supply system, water filter plants, drainage and 
sewerage system including collection and disposal 
points, irrigation canals, dams, floodgates, dikes and 
others. 
Besides these, communication related 
projects, solid waste management are also regarded 
as economic infrastructure projects. On the other 
hand, social infrastructure projects focus on welfare 
and well being of the nation such as education, health 
care, tourism and recreation facilities (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2004). Some of the examples of social 
infrastructure projects defined by Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004) and Wikipedia on infrastructure (2012): 
 Governance projects: These 
projects focus on providing the network for 
governance and protection to the community. The 
examples of governance projects include government 
offices, courthouses, prisons, police stations, fire 
protection facilities, military bases, arms depots, 
training facilities, and command centers. 
 Health Facilities: These projects 
focus on providing necessary arrangement to care 
about health of the citizens. The examples of heath 
facilities are hospitals, clinics, educational institutes, 
research centers, elementary and secondary schools, 
universities and colleges, charity centers. 
 Cultural, sports and recreational 
projects: These projects ensure the happiness and 
recreational caring of the nation. The examples of 
cultural, sport and recreational projects are parks, 
sport complexes, museums, libraries, theatres, 
convention centers, hotels, restaurants and others. 
These infrastructure projects are very 
essential for improving the quality of human life and 
country’s economic growth. Their importance is 
reflected in extended the expenditures for providing 
infrastructure facilities by government. Statistical 
record shows that, in Malaysia Government 
expenditure on infrastructure was increased year by 
year from 1965. Summary of the expenditures 
expansion since 1st Malaysian plan until 9th
PPP is a form of joint venture procurement 
which involves government and private sector to 
work jointly for public projects. PPP is successfully 
implemented for infrastructure projects worldwide. It 
has offered various benefits which motivate the 
private sector to work jointly with government. These 
benefits include risk transfer, cost, time savings and 
also partnering benefit. Among these, risk Transfer is 
a major benefit which allows public authorities and 
private sector to share their risk. With risk transfer, 
government has an advantage that public sectors 
construct and deliver the service using their capital 
assets. As an example of risk sharing, in any 
construction project the contractors have to bear the 
risk related to the construction process. Similarly, the 
risk associated to design work is transferred to the 
designer and the risk related to land, official 
approvals are barred by government (Cheung et. al. 
2010). 
 
Malaysian plan is presented in Table 1 where it is 
evident that Malaysian government has invested a 
large portion of the total development expenditures 
on infrastructure development. A quite fast expansion 
of infrastructure capital stock for the past fifty years 
can be observed. In addition, after the privatization 
process started in early 1980s, which is currently 
adopted through PPP concept; still has transformed 
the infrastructure landscape in Malaysia. However, it 
is need to learn lessons and use of experience gained 
from the past for bringing positive improvements in 
the sector (Lee, 2011). 
 
3. Benefits of PPP Procurement 
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Table 1. Public development expenditure on infrastructure, 1965-2010 (Current Prices, RM Million) 
 
Notes: MP: Malaysia Plan. NA: Not available 
 
Cost Saving is another major benefit which 
can be achieved by implementing PPP procurement. 
Cost saving can be attained by reducing lifecycle cost 
of the project. Consequently, the profits margin will 
be maximized. This highly depends on strategic 
planning, expertise level of the private sector, use of 
advanced technology and creative thinking. A very 
significant portion of the cost can be saved by using a 
resilient material. This will definitely reduce the 
maintenance cost through the life span of the project 
(Corbett and Smith, 2006; Environment, Transport 
and Works Bureau, 2004; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; 
Akintoye et al., 2003; Li et al., 2005a; So et al., 2007, 
Li, 2003; Efficiency Unit, 2002; European 
Commission, 2004; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, 2004; British Columbia, 
1999 cited by Cheung, 2009). 
Other than cost saving, PPP process is very 
effective for time saving and often the projects are 
finished before the contract time, and the consortium 
can start generating revenue by opening the facilities 
or services to public. Further, private is motivated to 
finish the project earlier as with early completion 
they receive incentive but if delayed, it can cause 
compensation. Therefore, the consortium is often 
focusing on achieving all milestones on time, if not 
earlier (Chan, et al. 2006) and thus with the 
incentives approaches, PPP projects can proceed as 
scheduled (Environment, Transport and Works 
Bureau, 2004; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Akintoye et 
al., 2003; Li, 2003; Efficiency Unit, 2002 cited by 
Cheung, 2009). Besides these, PPP has potential of 
receiving partnering benefits. In these benefits, at the 
government side, PPP frees up financial funds which 
helps in managing cash flow as huge upfront capital 
outflow is substitute by periodic service payments. 
Further, the project projects delivered via the private 
sector mostly involve the financing done through 
private sector. Consequently, by using private sector 
funding,  government transmit public expenditures to 
support other divisions of higher priority required for 
welfare of nations such as education, healthcare and 
community services (Li et al., 2005b; Efficiency 
Unit, 2002). On the other hand, PPP enables the 
private sector to access to public sector markets. If a 
private sector has prepared accurate cost estimation 
of the facility, it will results in high profit turn out on 
investment on a long-term basis. Nevertheless, 
partnering benefit create co-operation among 
different collaborating parties and encouraged 
business opportunities to create the large scope of 
works (Environment, Transport and Works Bureau, 
2004; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Boussabaine, 2007; 
European Commission Directorate, 2003; United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2004) 
 
4. Limitations of PPP implementation 
Though PPP exerts various benefits to both 
public and private sectors, it also has some 
limitations such as political and social risks; 
unfavorable monetary and commercial conditions; 
high Transaction costs and lengthy lead time. Among 
these, political risk is the most significant limitation 
in PPP practices. Often public sector opposition and 
governmental limitations on imposed on private 
parties. This might be because the politicians are not 
aware of life cost of the project and hence they 
cannot observe the advantage of PPP process. 
Further, central government has also lack of 
knowledge on PPP implementations (Liu and 
Wilkinson 2011). Among private companies also, 
there is misapprehending regarding PPP as form of 
privatization (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Owles, 
2008). This constructs impenetrability in persuading 
the different stakeholders on PPP policy. Though, 
traditional stakeholders are deemed to be inclined to 
support PPP, however, socialist stakeholders learn to 
view PPP as a removal of public assets into private 
hands (Liu and Wilkinson 2011). In developing 
countries, poor economic growth exerts the negative 
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impact in getting private sector in confidence for 
investment. Poor capital market also is a major 
hindrance in getting finance from private sector 
(Zhang, 2005). For example; remote topography such 
as New Zealand, where there is the small number of 
main contractors, investment banks and facility 
management companies of a suitable size, it is a big 
challenge to thrash about to pull competitive 
stakeholders (Liu and Wilkinson 2011). Besides 
these, international practitioners disparage PPP for 
the high transaction cost and lengthy lead time 
required for bringing infrastructure into service 
(Efficiency Unit, 2008; Zhang, 2005, Liu and 
Wilkinson 2011). In PPP, tender document 
preparation, making contractual agreement and 
negotiation process also takes relatively larger time 
(Liu and Wilkinson 2011). All these result in causing 
complexity of PPP bidding process. This complexity 
is classified into two categories of factors as an 
internal factor and external factors. Internal factor of 
complexity is related to the problem incurred by 
contractor’s decision of bidding and their quoted 
prices. Other than this, the problems such as 
difficulties caused by project size, technological 
issues, accessibility to the site, quality of plans and 
specifications, government regulation and availability 
of other projects are regarded as an external factor. 
According to Russell (1996) there are various 
advantages and disadvantages of selecting most 
competent bidder which are: 
1. It gives an opportunity of selecting 
the bidders with sufficient qualification and 
experience needed to carry out the project. 
2. It gives an opportunity for 
recognizing the contractors who are overloaded due 
to their ongoing projects as giving a new project to 
them will affect their capacity and resources. 
3. It reduces the chance of giving 
projects to the unsuitable bidder, 
4. In developing, implementing and 
evaluating the contractor’s qualification, relatively 
higher cost is spent 
5. Developing qualification criteria in 
accordance with the project requirement for a specific 
project with certain change environment and 
circumstances in enable to make correct and logical 
decision is a difficult task 
In addition, lack of proper regular project 
procurement process, poor project definition and 
demand of client’s requirement at the tender stage 
often cause PPP process costly and lengthy (Aziz, 
2007; Ke et al., 2011).  
 
5. Failure Cases of PPP Project 
Although PPP is very effective procurement 
method, but due to misunderstanding and limitations 
as discussed in an earlier section, there are various 
PPP projects which failed in achieving their goals. 
These failures are caused by various reasons such as 
financial issues (Arboleda and Ricaurte) and complex 
institutional arrangements especially in the case when 
public partners are accountable to multiple 
government agencies and regulators. For example: In 
case of a railway project, for approval of the 
concessioner scheme, the public partners are 
accountable to Ministry of Finance, local government 
are involved for clearance of right of the way; 
designs are approved by railway regulation authority 
and so on (Soomro and Zhang 2011). Therefore, in 
many countries, governments have established a 
separate unit for handling PPP projects like in 
Malaysia, UKAS was established to replace EPU for 
enhancing the capability of the unit to deliver an 
efficient PPP projects. But yet, there are many 
projects failed worldwide. As an example Batu Pahat 
Municipal Council (BPMC) in Malaysia executed 
with PPP along with the failure reasons adopted from 
Singaravelloo (2010) is discussed here. 
BPMC project is the development of a bus 
station located at Jalan Rogayah in Batu Pahat, Johor. 
The surrounding area was unsystematic where buses 
and taxis were parked randomly. It was full of a 
number of hawker stalls for selling foods to 
passengers. Overall, the site was considered 
immature as the whole area was dirty and 
unattractive. Hence, BPMC, the owner of the land 
planned redevelopment of the area for providing a 
systematic transportation to public. For this, BPMC 
took initiatives for redeveloping the existing facilities 
and encouraging better economic activities within the 
building and its surroundings. For executing the 
project, a private developer ABEEI (full name 
withheld for confidentiality) was invited who 
produced the design of the services. The design was 
scrutinized by the management and approved by 
board council meeting and the state government. The 
scope of the work assigned to the developer is shown 
in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Scope of the Project 
 Source: Singaravelloo, 2010 
 
The agreement took place with the condition 
that, from the car parks managed by the developer, 
the profits will be shared with ration of 60:40 where 
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council will take the largest share and the complex 
will be owned by the council after 60 years. But, in 
1996 when the council could not pay the 
management fees to the developer, the contractual 
problem started to occur. To manage the expenses, 
the developer refused to pay assessment tax with the 
justification that the council is failed in paying the 
management fees. Since 2006, the council started to 
occupy the floor from 11 to 14 while the developer 
was not willing for further negotiation and did not 
precede any marketing plan for interested parties who 
were ready to move to the complex. The developer 
offered BPMC to take over complete complex and 
manage themselves because of the no-payment of 
management fees.  BPMC refused that condition and 
took a legal action against the developer in 2008. Due 
to financial problem, the developer could not pay 
electricity bill and also could not manage the 
complex. Consequently, power supply was 
disconnected. This caused disruption with elevator, 
lift and air-conditioning facilities. Hence, the 
developer had a hard time with tenants and customers 
associated with the complex and many tenants 
declined to pay management fees. One of the major 
reasons for this failure was that the consortium 
partner was not selected through open bidding 
process. Finally, the council took charge of BPMC 
and bared administration and maintenance expense of 
the complex. Other than this, there are various cases 
of failure occurred in PPP project worldwide. Some 
of the projects are summarized in table 3. 
 
6. LRT Case Study Findings 
Case study was carried out through face to 
face and telephonic interviewing with the personnel 
from LRT companies involved in the contract. The 
data gathered and findings are discussed in following 
sections.  
 
6.1 Project History and Brief 
Due to rapid development, Malaysia is 
experiencing growth in population. This has resulted 
in increasing number of vehicle on the road 
especially in the city of Kuala Lumpur. The citizens 
often face problems because of congestion around the 
city. To overcome this problem, government has 
stepped forward with LRT projects which are very 
effective solution of congestion. Besides this, LRT is 
an efficient alternative to reduce and avoid pollution 
since the system also used modern technology with 
electrically-powered trains. LRT network connected 
with important key districts such as banks, 
government offices, sport complex, hotels, light 
industrial area and shopping mall which facilitate 
citizens for easy movement from place to place 
quickly (Kuala Lumpur LRT, 2012). 
The route of Kuala Lumpur LRT is divided 
into two routes. Route 1 is known as Ampang Line, 
which connects Ampang and Sri Petaling lines. Route 
2 Kelana Jaya Line which connects Kelana Jaya with 
Gombak. LRT project was implemented with Build 
Operate Transfer (BOT) type of contracting. The 
contract was carried out between Malaysia 
Government, Sistem Transit Aliran Ringan Sdn Bhd 
(STAR-LRT) and Projek Usahasama Transit Ringan 
Automatik Sdn Bhd (PUTRA-LRT). The agreed 
concession period for both the train lines is 60 years 
(Lee, 2011).  
Among the contract parties, PUTRA-LRT 
owned by Renong Bhd, was assigned for carrying out 
design work, actual construction, operate and 
maintenance. The selection of this company was 
done based on its past effective reputation in 
executing engineering and management field. The 
company had vast experience of handling highway, 
power generation and infrastructure projects. The 
contract signature was executed on 7th August 1995 
for 29 km long line with 24 stations. Among these, 5 
stations were underground, 18 elevated and 1 at-
grade at distant of 1.1 km.  Execution of PUTRA-
LRT included 2 segments where segment 1 
connected Lembah Subang with Pasar Seni while 
segment 2 connected Pasar Seni with Ambang Park 
and Gombak. For executing project successfully, the 
financial loan was arranged by involving 4 major 
groups which are Commerce International Merchant 
Bankers Bhd (CIMB), Bank Bumiputra Malaysia 
Bhd (BBMB), Commerce MGI Sdn Bhd (CMGI) and 
Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd (BIMB). These groups 
involved 27 various financial partners to support the 
financial needs of the project. 
Another party involved in LTR contract was 
STAR-LRT in which a British company, Taylor 
Woodrow was the largest shareholder. This group 
had financed and constructed the project with a value 
of 850 million creating one of the largest privately 
financed infrastructure projects in the world. Hence, 
Taylor Woodrow and Adtranz formed a consortium 
to finance and execute Malaysian LRT project. Led 
by Taylor Woodrow, the consortium developed the 
system through to the operational concept and formed 
the operating company called STAR. Hence, STAR-
LRT and Malaysia Government signed a concession 
agreement for 60 years. The agreement was executed 
in two phases separately for LRT linking central 
business district with the eastern suburbs and 
commonwealth games village with a northern 
extension of the city centre on 22 December 1992 
and 26 June 1995 respectively. LRT work comprised 
27 km track where cost for Phase 1 was RM 1.2 
billion and for phase 2 was RM 2.2 billion. For 
executions work, STAR-LRT took a loan of RM 800 
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million for phase 1 and loan of RM 1.32 billion  for 
phase 2 works from Bank Bumiputra. Overall, 
finance for construction cost was met through 24% 
equity, 60% commercial loans and 16% government 
loans with a total of 55% financed by Malaysian 
financers, 30% held by consortium and 15% from 
international financiers (Kuala Lumpur LRT, 2012).  
 
Table 3. Example of PPP Failed Projects and Failure Reasons 
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Consortium STAR classified work 
responsibilities in a way that all building and track 
construction works were to be carried out by Taylor 
Woodrow Company and all electro-mechanical 
works and the supply of rolling stock were handed 
over to Adtranz.  Route layout and conceptual design 
work were carried out by Taylor Woodrow, which 
blended modern and efficient rail network with local 
architectural and cultural influences. Thus, the 
construction of Phase One started in 1993 through 27 
km track and was completed in December 1995. The 
service for 13 stations situated within 12 Km track 
connecting Ampang and Jalan Sultan Ismail was 
started in December 1996 while operation for 9.5 km 
extension connecting Chan Sow Lin station with 
National Sports Complex and the Games Village at 
Bukit Jalil was opened for operation in early 1998. 
 
6.2 Major Issues and failure factors 
The failure of LRT started in 1997 during 
the operations as Malaysia faced financial crisis 
where inflation rate increased from 8% to over 40% 
(as revealed during an interview with UKAS 
Officer). Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) also 
had a loss of more than 50% and remained from 
above 1,200 to fewer than 600. Value of the ringgit 
also was reached 50% of its value where dollar 
reached to approximately 4.57. Besides that; due to 
this crisis, in 1998 economy in the construction sector 
was reduced by 23.5%, manufacturing was shrunk 
9% and the agriculture sector reduced by 5.9% 
(Financial crisis, 2012). Similarly, LRT services were 
turned to inefficient because of experiencing lower 
passenger rate compared to the anticipated. As a 
result, in Klang valley approximately 16% of the 
LRT trips were reduced. Consequently, START-LRT 
and PUTRA-LRT could not pay back their loans.  In 
order to control the financial situation, START-LRT 
and PUTRA-LRT requested Corporate Debt 
Restructuring Committee (CDRC) of Malaysia's 
central bank, Bank Negara, to assist for streamlining 
the debts (Bursa Saham, 1999). Initially, CDRC 
proposed that Government may take over the LRT 
line from concessioners and lease back to same 
concessioner which was not accepted at that time. 
Later after two years, in response of another proposal 
restructuring of debt was carried out where 
government set 2 government-owned companies. 
Among these, one company owned LRT and other 
was responsible for operating public transportation 
system. This resulted in reducing the level of non-
performance for repaying loans by .7% in six-
months. But yet, both the companies failed in 
repaying the loan and hence government issued a 
notice of default to START-LRT and PUTRA-LRT 
with demand of repaying loans within 14 days. After 
going through legal process, High court appointed a 
liquidator to settle the issue and finally in September 
2002, the Malaysian Ministry of Finance announced 
that, on the behalf of the government of Malaysia, 
Syarikat Prasana Negara Berhad will take over both 
PUTRA-LRT and STAR-LRT.   
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper focused on studying the reasons 
of failure of LRT Kuala Lumpur through 
interviewing the companies involved in LRT project. 
The failure of the project might be because of PPP is 
a new approach in Malaysian construction industry. 
With PPP, government has encouraged private sector 
for participating in enhancing nation development. 
During the case study, it was identified that Kuala 
Lumpur LRT project was failed during the operation 
phase. Key reason of the failure was the financial 
crisis of 1997 where inflation rate increased from 8% 
to over 40%. This financial crisis resulted to the less 
profit rate, and the concessionaires were not able to 
repay the loan to the banks which they had taken for 
LRT construction works. Finally, through undergoing 
a legal process in 2002, Syarikat Prasana Negara 
Berhad took over PUTRA-LRT and STAR-LRT on 
the behalf of the government of Malaysia. 
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